Category Archives: Canadian Politics

Discredited economics and the revered economist

Posted on by under Canadian Politics

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 there was much talk from within and without the economics profession about what went wrong.  Many on the outside of the profession viewed the crisis as the result of the slavish devotion of policy makers to the advice of academic and private sector economists.  The outsiders continue to be astonished that economists are taken seriously any more.

The rest of this post is here.

I can’t spell: the phonetic problem with homonyms

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I can’t, and it has gotten worse.  Sure I used to get my i’s and e’s backwards frequently but the difference between there and their or lose and loose almost never.  It is now a pathological subterfuge on my part.  I can only beg my readers’ forgiveness.  Technically, though, I don’t think I am having spelling problems because I am spelling the wrong word correctly.  Something deeper has gotten fried.  I wonder if it is the French language training and immersion.  Perhaps it is a deep reversion to phonetics.

Thanks for the comment on the last post.

Mulcair Wins. Who Loses?

Posted on by under Canadian Politics

It is official the NDP now has a former Liberal as the head of their party.  Not so bad.  The Liberals have a former dipper as the head of their party.  I think the loser in all of this is Canadians who are not conservative.  True the distance between the major parties, on economic policy, has gone from wide to vanishingly small over the last 30 years.  Recall that Layton ran on balanced budgets the day after the crisis.  From a social cultural perspective there is now almost nothing that separates the Liberals from the NDP.  Under Mulcair the NDP’s foreign policy stance will go in a hawkish direction if his position on Israel (right or wrong) is anything to go by.

What, then, keeps the two parties from merging?  Technically, at this point, nothing save for history.  There are simply too many Dippers and too many Liberals that cannot contemplate a conversation let alone a merger.  My prediction is that the NDP and Liberals will continue to fight over official opposition status.  The irony here is that neither party under their existing leaders is sufficiently different at this point to sustain the façade of choice between centre and centre-left.  The centre left has collapsed.  It would be remiss to blame Mulcair for this.  He is simply the recipient of exhausted social democratic (and nationalism in both English and French Canada) fortunes.

The ubiquitous economist, the media, and Plato

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It is odd.  No other discipline in the social science gets away with being considered by the media as a jack of all trades as the economist does.  Think about it.  If you go to a neurosurgeon with a question about pancreatic cancer he or she may giggle but they will not answer your question.  Why would you ask an econometrician about say for example a provincial budget?  You would think at the very least the journalist in question would ask if there expert really was an expert in the field of public finance. It is pretty easy to figure that out.  Go to their website and look at their CV and try to answer a series of simple questions:

Does the economist in question of the relevant training in public finance?

Did they write their dissertation on public finance?

Do they teach courses on public finance?

Are any of their peer reviewed papers on public finance?

Do other experts in the field of public finance consider them to be experts on public finance?

I would humbly suggest that the economist in question needs to score at least two out of five on the questionnaire.  And it won’t take any more than 30 minutes of your googling time to get the picture.

If the only answer that you can come with is he or she must know more than yourself because they are a prof and you are not then what you are probing is rhetoric not a considered effort at the truth of the matter.  Punditry, in short.  Which is fine, but then introduce your favourite ubiquitous economist as a pundit not an economist.

So here is one of my favourite passages from Plato’s the Gorgias:

Soc. But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Although he is not a physician:-is he?

Gor. No.

Soc. And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician knows.

Gor. Clearly.

Soc. Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?-is not that the inference?

Gor. In the case supposed:-Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?-not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

Soc. Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some. one else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him-it is not your business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.

Gor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

Soc. Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you.

Gor. Certainly.

Anyway I realise I have lost my audience by this point, but on the slim chance you are still here, will you just please read it again.

Dutch Disease and Oil

Posted on by under Canadian Politics

CBC’s the Current had an excellent segment on Dutch Disease and what to do about it.  The set-up was quite good.  First they interviewed an economist about what Dutch disease actually is and to what extent it applies to Canada.  Then they interviewed my favourite gliberal economist.  His response was boilerplate: there was ‘nothing to be done’ (Lenin’s mirror).  Then the Current did something really interesting, they actually interviewed an expert.  You know, someone with the relevant training for the subject at hand and with direct and detailed experience: one of the architects of Norway’s oil sector.  Imagine that.

The interesting point he made is that revenue generated out of the resource sector (and Norwegian government generates as a percent of the total take almost more than anywhere else) and plough some of it back into productivity enhancing investment in other non-oil related sectors of the economy.  All very standard anti-staples trap theory thinking.

http://www.cbc.ca/video/news/audioplayer.html?clipid=2210373565

Three things I wish heterodox economists would quit talking about

Posted on by under Canadian Politics

Number 1.  Mainstream economics and heterodox economics

To be consistent it should be homodox economics and heterodox economics.  Those with routine knowledge of Latin would find nothing nefarious in such a distinction. Although we do have other names.  Why not apologetic economics and non-apologetic economics?  I am rather more fond of vulgar economics and economics.

Number 2.  Is mainstream, vulgar, apologetic economics scientific?

They think so, and so do I.  It is called scientific liberalism.

Number 3.  The capital controversy.

Vulgar economists don’t care.  See 1 and 2.

Joseph Stiglitz: not a gliberal economist

Posted on by under Canadian Politics, Real Economists

Stiglitz prefaced his 2001 Memorial Prize Lecture with a clear explanation of what motivated his study in economics:

When I began the study of economics some forty one years ago, I was struck by the incongruity between the models that I was taught and the world that I had seen growing up, in Gary Indiana, a city whose rise and fall paralleled the rise and fall of the industrial economy. Founded in 1906 by U.S. Steel, and named after its Chairman of the Board, by the end of the century it had declined to but a shadow of its former self. But even in its heyday, it was marred by poverty, periodic unemployment, and massive racial discrimination. Yet the theories that we were taught paid little attention to poverty, said that all markets cleared – including the labor market, so unemployment must be nothing more than a phantasm, and that the profit motive ensured that there could not be economic discrimination. If the central theorems that argued that the economy was Pareto efficient – that, in some sense, we were living in the best of all possible worlds – were true, it seemed to me that we should be striving to create a different world.

Stiglitz is treated with much derision by other economists these days.  Some say it is because after the prize he became too populist.  As compared to who? Friedman? He went populist way before he got his memorial prize.

I suspect Stiglitz’s sins are rather the same as they have always been.  He came to study capitalism not defend it.  The new classical, Chicago (fresh water) side of the profession came to defend capitalism not understand it.  In a weird twist Stiglitz, a liberal economist, who attempts to understand capitalism is denounced as unscientific while those who merely came to obscure, cloak themselves in the garb of the scientist.  Such is often the case.

Fuck em, they don’t count.  Besides being brilliant Stiglitz was (still is) prolific.  Below I have reproduced his entire publication record until the date of his prize.  Next time you hear an economist slag Stiglitz ask for a copy of their publication record:

Stiglitz, J. E., “A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem,” American Economic
Review, 59(5), December 1969a: pp. 784–793.
–, “Rural-Urban Migration, Surplus Labor and the Relationship Between Urban and Rural
Wages,” East African Economic Review, 1–2, December 1969b: pp. 1–27.
–, “On the Optimality of the Stock Market Allocation of Investment”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 86(1), February 1972a: pp. 25–60.
–, “Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-Overs,”
Bell Journal of Economist, 3(2), Autumn 1972b, pp. 458–482.
–, “Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination,” American Economic Review, 62(2), May
1973a, pp. 287–295. (Reprinted in W. Darity and C. Boshamer (eds.), Economics and
Discrimination, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993.)
–, “Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital”, Journal of Public Economics,
2, February 1973b: pp. 1–34.
–, “Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.’s: The
Labor Turnover Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(2), May 1974a, pp. 194–227.
–, “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping”, Review of Economic Studies, 41, April
1974b: pp. 219–255.
–, “On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy,” American Economic Review, 64(6),
December 1974c: pp. 851–866.
–, “Theories of Discrimination and Economic Policy,” In Patterns of Racial Discrimination, G.
von Furstenberg, et al. (eds.), D.C. Heath and Company (Lexington Books), 1974d, pp.
5–26.
–, “Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy,” Bell Journal of
Economics, 6(2), Autumn 1975a, pp. 552–579.
–, “Information and Economic Analysis,” in J.M. Parkin and A.R. Nobay, eds. Current Economic
Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1975b: pp. 27–52.
–, “The Theory of Screening, Education and the Distribution of Income,” American
Economic Review, 65(3), June 1975c: pp. 283–300.
–, “The Efficiency of Market Prices in Long Run Allocations in the Oil Industry,” in Studies
in Energy Tax Policy, G. Brannon (ed.), Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1975d, pp.
55–99.
–, “The Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Surplus Labor and the Distribution of Income in
L.D.C.’s,” Oxford Economic Papers, 28(2), July 1976: pp. 185–207.
534
–, “Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market,”
Review of Economic Studies, 44, October 1977a, pp. 407–430.
–, “Symposium on the Economics of Information: Introduction,” Review of Economic Studies,
44(138), October 1977b, pp. 389–391.
–, “Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information,” American Economic Review,
69(2), May 1979a: pp. 339–345.
–, “On Search and Equilibrium Price Distributions,” In Economics and Human Welfare: Essays
in Honor of Tibor Scitovsky, M. Boskin (ed.), York: Academic Press Inc., 1979b, pp. 203–
236.
–, “Pareto Optimality and Competition,” Journal of Finance, 36(2), May 1981, pp. 235–251.
–, “Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage
Model,” in The Theory and Experience of Economic Development: Essays in Honor of Sir Arthur
W. Lewis, M. Gersovitz, et al. (eds.), London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982a, pp. 78–106.
–, “The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium,” Review of Economic Studies, XLIX,
April 1982b: pp. 241–261.
–, “Information and Capital Markets,” in Financial Economics: Essays in Honor of Paul Cootner,
William F. Sharpe and Cathryn Cootner (eds.), Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1982c, pp.
118–158.
–, “Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital
Markets,” in Economic Regulation: Essays in Honor of James R. Nelson, Kenneth D. Boyer and
William G. Shepherd (eds.), Michigan State University, 1982, pp. 311–341.
–, “Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 17, 1982e: pp.
213–240.
–, “The Structure of Labor Markets and Shadow Prices in L.D.C.’s,” in Migration and the
Labor Market in Developing Countries, R. Sabot (ed.), Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982f, pp.
13–64.
–, “Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation,” Journal of Public
Economics, 18, 1982g, pp. 1–33.
–, “Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard,” The Geneva Papers,
January 1983, 8(26), pp. 4–32.
–, “Information, Screening and Welfare,” In Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Marcel
Boyer and Richard Khilstrom (eds.), Elsevier Science Publications, 1984a, pp. 209–239.
–, “Price Rigidities and Market Structure,” American Economic Review, 74(2), May 1984b: pp.
350–356.
–, “Credit Markets and the Control of Capital,” Journal of Money, Banking, and Credit, 17(2),
May 1985a: pp. 133–152.
–, “Economics of Information and the Theory of Economic Development,” Revista De
Econometria, 5(1), April 1985b: pp. 5–32.
–, “Equilibrium Wage Distribution,” Economic Journal, 95, September 1985c: pp. 595–618.
–, “Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective,” Economic Journal, 95(0), 1985d, pp.
21–41.
–, “The New Development Economics,” World Development, 14(2), 1986a: pp. 257–265.
–, “Theories of Wage Rigidities,” in Keynes’ Economic Legacy: Contemporary Economic Theories,
J.L. Butkiewicz, et al. (eds.), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986b, pp.153–206.
–, “Theory of Competition, Incentives and Risk,” in New Developments in the Theory of Market
Structure, J.E. Stiglitz and F. Mathewson (eds.), MacMillan/MIT Press, 1986c, pp.399–449.
–, “The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Prices,” Journal of
Economic Literature 25(1) March 1987a: pp. 1–48.
–, “Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive
Than Atomistic Markets?” Journal of Political Economy, 95(5), 1987b, pp. 1041–1061.
–, “Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing,” in Incentives,
Cooperation and Risk Sharing, H. Nalbantian (ed.), Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld,
1987c, pp.47–68.
535
–, “Learning to Learn, Localized Learning and Technological Progress,” in Economic Policy
and Technological Performance, P. Dasgupta and Stoneman (eds.), Cambridge University
Press, 1987d, pp. 125–153.
–, “On the Microeconomics of Technical Progress,” in Technology Generation in Latin
American Manufacturing Industries, Jorge M. Katz (ed.), The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1987e,
pp. 56–77.
–, “Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics,” in Handbook on
Public Economics, A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), North Holland: Elsevier Science
Publishers, 1987f: pp. 991–1042.
–, “Sharecropping,” in The New Palgrave: A dictionary of Economics, MacMillan Press, 1987g.
–, “Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
3, 1987h.
–, “The Wage-Productivity Hypothesis: Its Economic Consequences and Policy Implications,”
In Modern Developments in Public Finance, M.J. Boskin (ed.), Basil Blackwell, 1987i,
pp. 130–165.
–, “Human Nature and Economic Organization,” Jacob Marashak Lecture, presented at Far
Eastern Meetings of the Econometric Society, October 1987j.
–, “Economic Organization, Information, and Development,” in Handbook of Development
Economics, H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.), Elsevier Science Publishers, 1988a, pp.
185–201.
–, “Money, Credit, and Business Fluctuations,” Economic Record, 64(187), December 1988b:
pp. 62–72.
–, “On the Relevance or Irrelevance of Public Financial Policy,” in The Economics of Public
Debt, (Proceedings of the 1986 International Economics Association Meeting), Macmillan
Press, 1988c: pp. 4–76.
–, “Why Financial Structure Matters,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(4), 1988d: pp.
121–126.
–, The Economic Role of the State, A. Heertje (ed.), Basil Blackwell and Bank Insinger de
Beaufort NV, 1989a, pp. 9–85.
–, “Financial Markets and Development,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 5(4), 1989b: pp.
55–68.
–, “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1,
Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989c, pp. 769–847.
–, “Incentives, Information and Organizational Design,” Empirica, 16(1), January 1989d: pp.
3–29.
–, “Markets, Market Failures and Development,” American Economic Review, 79(2), May
1989e: pp. 197–203.
–, “Monopolistic Competition and the Capital Market,” in The Economics of Imperfect Competition
and Employment – Joan Robinson and Beyond, G. Feiwel (ed.), New York: New York
University Press, 1989f, pp. 485–507.
–, “Mutual Funds, Capital Structure, and Economic Efficiency,” in Theory of Valuation –
Frontiers of Modern Financial Theory, Vol. 1, S. Bhattacharya and G. Constantinides (eds.),
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989g, pp. 342–356.
–, “Principal and Agent,” in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information and Markets, J. Eatwell,
et al. (eds.), MacMillan Press, London, 1989h, pp. 241–253.
–, “Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions and the Theory of Rural Organization,” in The
Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, P. Bardhan (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989i,
pp. 18–29.
–, Reflections on the State of Economics: 1988,” Economic Record, March 1989j, pp. 66–72.
–, “Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading,” Journal of Financial Services
Research, 3(2/3), December 1989k, pp. 101–115.
–, “Some Retrospective Views on Growth Theory presented on the occasion of the
Celebration of Robert Solow’s 65th Birthday,” in Growth/Productivity/Unemployment, P.
Diamond (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990a, pp. 50–68.
536
–, “Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets,” World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), September
1990b: pp. 351–366.
–, “Another Century of Economic Science,” Economic Journal Anniversary Issue, 101(404),
January 1991a, pp. 134–141; The Future of Economics, J.D. Hey (ed.), Blackwell Publishers,
1992, pp. 134–141.
–, “Development Strategies: The Roles of the State and the Private Sector,” in Proceedings of
the World Bank’s Annual Conference on Development Economics 1990, 1991b, pp. 430–35.
–, “Introduction to Symposium on Organizations and Economics,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 5(2), Spring 1991c, pp. 15–24.
–, “The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics,” in Information Strategy and Public
Policy, D. Vines and A. Stevenson (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991f pp. 12–50.
–, “Some Theoretical Aspects of the Privatization: Applications to Eastern Europe,” Revista
di Politica Economica, December 1991d, pp. 179–204.
–, “The Economic Role of the State: Efficiency and Effectiveness” Efficiency and Effectiveness
in the Public Domain. The Economic Role of the State, T.P. Hardiman and M. Mulreany (eds.),
Institute of Public Administration, 1991e: pp. 37–59.
–, “Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment,” in
The Economics of Cooperation: East Asian Development and the Case for Pro-Market Intervention,
J.A. Roumasset and S. Barr (eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, 1992a, pp. 15–38.
–, “Capital Markets and Economic Fluctuations in Capitalist Economies,” European Economic
Review, 36, North-Holland, 1992b, pp. 269–306.
–, “Contract Theory and Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” in Contract Economics, L. Werin and
H. Wijkander (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992c: pp. 292–322.
–, “The Design of Financial Systems for the Newly Emerging Democracies of Eastern
Europe,” in The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, C. Clague and G.C.
Rausser (eds.), Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992d pp. 161–184.
–, “Explaining Growth: Competition and Finance,” Rivista di Politica Economica (Italy),
82(169), November 1992e, p. 225.
–, “Introduction: S&L Bailout,” in The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance: Disciplining the
Government and Protecting Taxpayers, J. Barth and R. Brumbaugh, Jr. (eds.), Harper Collins
Publishers, 1992f, pp. 1–12.
–, “Methodological Issues and the New Keynesian Economics,” Alternative Approaches to
Macro-economics, A. Vercelli and N. Dimitri (eds.), Oxford University Press, 1992g, pp.
38–86.
–, “Prices and Queues as Screening Devices in Competitive Markets,” in Economic Analysis of
Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn, D. Gale and O. Hart (eds.), Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1992h: pp. 128–166. (IMSSS Technical Report No. 212, Stanford University,
August 1976.).
–, “Notes on Evolutionary Economics: Imperfect Capital Markets, Organizational Design,
Long-run Efficiency.” Paper presented at a conference at Osaka University, 1992i.
–, “The Role of the State in Financial Markets”, Proceeding of the World Bank Conference on
Development Economics, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1993a: pp. 41–46.
–, “Consequences of Limited Risk Markets and Imperfect Information for the Design of
Taxes and Transfers: An Overview,” in K. Hoff, A. Braverman, and J. Stiglitz (eds.) The
Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy. New York: Oxford University
Press for the World Bank. 1993b.
–, “Perspectives on the Role of Government Risk-Bearing within the Financial Sector,” in
Government Risk-bearing, M. Sniderman (ed.), Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1993c: pp. 109–30.
–, “Some Theoretical Aspects of the Privatization: Applications to Eastern Europe,”
Privatization Processes in Eastern Europe, M. Baldassarri, L. Paganetto and E.S. Phelps (eds.),
St. Martin’s Press, Rome, 1993d, pp. 179–204.
–, “Economic Growth Revisited,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(1), 1994a: pp. 65–110.
–, “Endogenous Growth and Cycles,” Innovation in Technology, Industries, and Institutions, Y.
Shionoya and M. Perlman (eds.), The University of Michigan Press, 1994b, pp. 121–56.
537
–, Whither Socialism? Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994c.
–, “Interest Rate Puzzles, Competitive Theory and Capital Constraints,” in Economics in a
Changing World, Fitoussi, Jean-Paul ed., (Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the
International Economic Association, Moscow, Volume 5. Economic Growth and Capital
and Labour markets.) IEA Conference Volume 111, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995a:
pp. 145–75.
–, “Social Absorption Capability and Innovation,” in Social Capability and Long-Term Economic
Growth, Bon Ho Koo and D.H. Perkins (eds.), New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995b, pp.
48–81.
–, “Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle,” World Bank Research Observer, 11(2), August
1996, pp. 151–77.
–, “The Role of Government in Economic Development,” in Annual World Bank Conference
on Development Economics 1996, M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic (eds.), The World Bank, 1997a.
pp. 11–23.
–, “The Role of Government in the Economies of Developing Countries,” in E. Malinvaud
and A.K. Sen, eds. Development Strategy and the Management of the Market Economy. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997b, pp. 61–109.
–, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus,
The 1998 Wider Annual Lecture, Helsinki, January, 1998a .
–, “Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and Processes.” 9th Raul
Prebisch Lecture delivered at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, UNCTAD, October 19,
1998b.
–, “Pareto Efficient Taxation and Expenditure Policies, With Applications to the Taxation
of Capital, Public Investment, and Externalities,” presented at conference in honor of
Agnar Sandmo. January 1998c.
–, “Interest Rates, Risk, and Imperfect Markets: Puzzles and Policies”, Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 15(2), 1999a, pp 59–76.
–, “Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy, and Economic
Advice”, Proceedings from the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 1998. World
Bank, Washington D.C. Keynote Address, 1999b: pp 9–58.
–, “On Liberty, the Right to Know and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in
Public Life” (Paper presented at Oxford Amnesty Lecture), 1999c.
–, “Toward a General Theory of Wage and Price Rigidities and Economic Fluctuations”,
American Economic Review 89(2), May 1999d: pp. 75–80.
–, “Responding to Economic Crises: Policy Alternatives for Equitable Recovery and
Development.” The Manchester School 67(5) Special Issue 1999e, pp. 409–427.
–, “Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition”, Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference
on Development Economics 1999, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000a: pp. 27–56.
–, “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability” in World Development,
Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 1075–1086, 2000b.
–, “Formal and Informal Institutions” in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. P. Dasgupta
and I. Serageldin (eds.), The World Bank: Washington, DC, 2000c: pp. 59–68.
–, “The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 2000d, pp. 1441–1477.
–, “Democratic Development as the Fruits of Labor,” Working Paper, Progressive Economics
Papers, January 2000e.
–, “Some Elementary Principles of Bankruptcy” in Governance, Equity and Global Markets
(Proceedings of Annual Bank Conference for Development Economics in Europe June 21–23, 1999) La Documentation Francaise, 2000f.
–, “Challenges in the Analysis of the Role of Institutions in Economic Development,” Villa Borsig Workshop Series 2000: The Institutional Foundations of a Market Economy. Gudrun Kochendorfer-Lucius and Boris Pleskovic (eds.), German Foundation for International Development (DSE), 2001a: pp 15–28.
–, “From Miracle to Recovery: Lessons from Four Decades of East Asian Experience,” Rethinking the East Asian Miracle. Shahid Yusuf ed. World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2001b. 538
–, “Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Approach,” The World Bank Observer 16(1), Spring 2001c: pp. 1–18.
–, “Crisis y Restructuración Financiera: el Papel de la Banca Central” Cuestiones Económicas 17(2), 2001d: pp. 3–24.
–, “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?” in Governance, equity, and global markets: the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Europe, J. E. Stiglitz and Pierre-Alain Muet (eds.)
World Bank, New York, Oxford University Press. 2001e: pp 22–54.
–, “New Perspectives on Public Finance: Recent Achieves and Future Challenges”, Journal of Public Economics (84), forthcoming, 2002.
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”
American Economic Review, 71(3), June 1981: pp. 393–410.
–, “Alternative Approaches to the Analysis of Markets with Asymmetric Information,”
American Economic Review, 73(1), March 1983a, pp. 246–249.
–, “Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets,” American Economic Review, 73(5), December 1983b, pp. 912–927.
–, “Credit Rationing and Collateral,” in Recent Developments in Corporate Finance, Jeremy
Edwards, et al. (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 101–135.
–, “Credit Rationing: Reply” , American Economic Review, March 1987, pp. 228–231.
–, “Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit”, Greek Economic Review, 12(0), Supplement, Autumn 1990, pp. 85–118.
–, “Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets and Its Implications for Macro-economics,”
Oxford Economic Papers, 44(4), October 1992, pp. 694–724.
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