Disparate Models, Desperate Measures: The Convergence of Limits ∗

This chapter was originally written back in 2003 and published in 2005 in the volume edited by David Coates (god father to a Miliband son I think) Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Approaches.  The data contained inter alia is by now stale in one sense.  However in another sense the document holds up for its time and place in the early Anglo-American debates on neoliberalism.  The trends I analyzed–rising income inequality, reduced welfare state effort, eroding quality and conditions of work, and a secular decline in productivity growth–across the rich OECD zone regardless of which model of capitalism was being pursued were in fact, as I noted at the time, secular trends.  At the time, 2003, most academics still had their heads in the ground about inequality and the punitive dynamics of neoliberal labour market policies.   Indeed the  hegemony of neoliberalism was so complete at that time most social democratic intellectuals refused or were incapable of acknowledging the state of affairs.  Even worse many were actively crafting and implementing neoliberal policies.

In the above sense I think the chapter still holds up.  Moreover, it also holds up in terms of its main hypothesis that the advanced capitalist zone, despite being populated by nation states with very different institutions and public policy regimes, was producing increasingly poor outcomes for workers and citizens. For A version of the chapter “Disparate Models, Desperate Measures: The Convergence of Limits,” leave a comment to request the document.

∗This article was originally published in David Coates (ed.) Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Approaches. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, (2005). The version of the article reproduced herein may be reproduced on a not for profit basis subject to the GNU Free Documentation License and provided proper citation is provided.
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Varieties of Capitalism: A Critique

Abstract

The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) has become the dominant approach in comparative political economy and enjoys wide application and attention in disciplines outside of political science and sociology. Indeed the VoC approach has enjoyed much attention in comparative industrial/employment relations (IR). This article undertakes a critical evaluation of the importation of the VoC paradigm into comparative IR. Inter alia, it is argued that the VoC approach, as it is presently configured, may have little to teach IR scholars because its basic theoretical concepts and methodological priors militate against accounting for change. This article begins with a summary of the routine problems researchers in comparative political economy and comparative IR have encountered when attempting to account for change within the constraints of the VoC paradigm. Here the focus is on the limitations imposed when privileging the national scale and the problems engendered by a heavy reliance on comparative statics methodology infused with the concepts of equilibrium and exogenous shocks. The article then goes beyond these routinely recognized limitations and argues that the importation of terminology from neoclassical economic theory, of which the original VoC statement makes foundational reference, further serves to constrain and add confusion to the comparative enterprise; namely, comparative advantage, Oliver Williamson’s neoclassical theory of the firm, the use of the distinction made between (im)perfect market competition in neoclassical economics and the fuzzy distinction made between firms, markets and networks.In the concluding section we argue that the VoC’s narrow focus on the firm and its coordination problems serve to legitimate IRs traditional narrow focus on labour management relations and the pride of place that HRM now enjoys in the remaining IR departments. Ultimately, however, the embrace of the VoC paradigm by comparative IR is a net negative normative move.

The full article can be found here

NGDP targeting: wither monetarism?

Monetarism is like a Zombie: it can be found theoretically wanting, empirically false and technically infeasible but in one form or another it just soldiers on.  In some ways the hype surrounding the conversation about the possibility of moving from an inflation based paradigm to targeting NGDP could be read as the end of monetarism.  But viewed from another angle it (NGDP targeting) can also be read as the latest reincarnation of monetarism.

Purists will of course bulk: monetarism died along time ago as central banks realized they did not control the money supply as private banks also create money all the time in the form of credit.  But if in narrow technical terms monetarism died soon after its birth, in broader political terms it came of age in the ensuing years.  As I see it there were three initial pillars to monetarism only one of which technical.  First, the CB can control the money supply (false) and thereby inflation; second, the CB should be independent (from democratic influence) to pursue price stability (not amenable to boolean operators); third, monetary policy is the preferred technocratic as opposed to democratic policy (fiscal) lever.  Even though the first be dead the second and third live on.

My problem with NGDP targeting is threefold.

First, proponents of of inflation targeting like the quasi monetarists are want to argue that the last twenty years of  inflation targeting has been a dizzying success.  As per Nick Rowe:

 We have 20 years of empirical evidence showing how inflation targeting works to stabilise expected and actual inflation.

Not so fast.  We have twenty years in which many things were happening: a move across the advanced capitalist zone to flexibilise labour markets and the incorporation of broad swaths of eastern European and Asian, and south Asian labour reserves into the global market; and increasing trade liberalisation and capital mobility. So I am not sure the CB’s should get all or even most of the credit for price stability over the last twenty years.  Although they may warrant some of the blame for higher average unemployment than the pre-monetarist CB regime.

Second, I remain to be convinced that the CB’s can actually target NGDP.  They, the CB,s, have a limited range of arrows in their tactical quiver.  If anything the present crisis has taught us (like the crisis of Keynesianism) at such periods in the micro-economic motivations swamp the thinking of businesses.  I suspect the BOC could announce tomorrow that it had raised its inflation target to 6% and not much would happen in real or nominal terms.  Defeating inflation was a rather simple exercise even if politically difficult.  All the CBs had to do was to put interest rates through the roof and kill off every marginal producer of goods and services.  Similarly keeping inflation in check (on target) was and is a relatively easy affair when one simply has to throw sand in the financial gears.  It becomes a problem of second order magnitude to target NGDP growth when everyone who counts knows you do not really have the ability to independently bring it about.

Nominal growth targeting means nominal investment targeting and in the context of already hyper low interests rates it is hard to see where the CB has a viable policy lever.  They can play around with quantitative easing (as they have already done) but all that appears to have done is set a soft floor on some classes of asset values.  And it is an open question as to whether or not this is a good thing.  On what rational basis was it decided that some asset values were worth preserving and others not?  More importantly putting a soft floor under some classes of asset values has done next to nothing for investment rates which is after all how you target underlying economic growth even when not discounted by inflation.

Third NGDP targeting is opaque in a way that inflation targeting is not.  There is a relatively decent link between the credible threat of high real interest rates and the threat of low real interest rates.  The former pushes noun against a verb the latter not so much.  Without the direct ability to determine aggregate investment rates the CBs are forced into much more cloistered channels with little to no capacity to sanction the relevant actors should it not get what it wants.

My critique probably boils down to the following.  It is only under a supremely unique set of circumstances that CBs found their targeting regime and interest rates to have such a profound positive influence on the level of economic activity.  In capitalist economies it is businesses that invest and hire (something both liberal and Marxist economists agree on) interest rates and asset valuations play only a small part of the calculus to invest.  The government on the other hand can use fiscal policy to indirectly stimulate investment through tax policy and directly control aggregate investment and thus employment via direct spending.

Ironically if the government was to monetize the debt by putting Peter in bed with Paul (the CB and the treasury) it would inadvertently give some real teeth to the CB’s ability to prove to the relevant economic actors that it was serious about targeting NGDP growth.  But I suspect Tory New-Keynesians like Rowe and Sumner would not abide.  For once you show that fiscal policy is in fact a powerful force for economic regulation the last two pillars of monetarism come a tumbling down.  Some version of industrial democracy would be back on the table.

Hardly what a Tory goes shooting for when they wake up early in the morning.

Gangster Capitalism: Same as it ever was?

If you are going to read one thing and just one thing on the financial crisis and how it is working itself out you need to read this blog post at naked capitalism:  the one stop shop for understanding contemporary finance.

After the September 2008 crash, Iceland’s government took over the old, collapsed, banks and created new ones in their place. Original bondholders of the old banks off-loaded the Icelandic bank bonds in the market for pennies on the dollar. The buyers were vulture funds. These bondholders became the owners of the old banks, as all shareholders were wiped out. In October, the government’s monetary authority appointed new boards to control the banks. Three new banks were set up, and all the deposits, mortgages and other bank loans were transferred to these new, healthier banks – at a steep discount. These new banks received 80 percent of the assets, the old banks 20 percent.

Then, owners of the old banks were given control over two of the new banks (87% and 95% respectively). The owners of these new banks were called vultures not only because of the steep discount at which the financial assets and claims of the old banks were transferred, but mainly because they already had bought control of the old banks at pennies on the dollar.

The result is that instead of the government keeping the banks and simply wiping them out in bankruptcy, the government kept aside and let vulture investors reap a giant windfall – that now threatens to plunge Iceland’s economy into chronic financial austerity. In retrospect, none of this was necessary. The question is, what can the government do to clean up the mess that it has created by so gullibly taking bad IMF advice?

In the United States, banks receiving TARP bailout money were supposed to negotiate with mortgage debtors to write down the debts to market prices and/or the ability to pay. This was not done. Likewise in Iceland, the vulture funds that bought the bad “old bank” loans were supposed to pass on the debt write-downs to the debtors. This was not done either. In fact, the loan principals continued to be revalued upward in keeping with Iceland’s unique indexing designed to save banks from taking a loss – that is, to make sure that the economy as a whole suffers, even suffering a fatal austerity attack, so that bankers will be “made whole.” This means making a windfall fortune for the vultures who buy bad loans on the cheap.

Go read the whole article.

The irony of greed: The end game for Neoliberalism?

The global economy is in the toilet and the Boomers’ representatives are chanting: “flush, flush, flush.”  Me? I am eating cigarettes and wine while admiring the remarkable consistency in the myopia of all of it.

In the name of fiscal prudence the whole of the advanced capitalist zone is in engaged in austerity budgeting and calls for more of the same.  Even Martin Wolf, in his otherwise insightful column in the FT online today, felt the need to tap his hat and nod in the direction of the genteelism of supply.  Exhibit A, the conclusion to his incisive intervention:

Reconsidering fiscal policy is not all that is needed. Monetary policy still has an important role. So, too, do supply-side reforms, particularly changes in taxation that promote investment. So, not least, does global rebalancing. Yet now, in a world of excess saving, the last thing we need is for creditworthy governments to slash their borrowings.

As is widely acknowledged, monetary policy has little outside of conciliatory role to play at this time.  In so far as the CBs should not make the mistake of tightening policy as the ECB and the BoC did.  But apart from the role of spoiler there really is not much left for the CBs to do.  The problem is squarely fiscal.  As Wolf himself went to pains to argue.  Why then the conclusion given that further tax reductions are not only going to make the fiscal positions of governments worse they will also likely have the same effect as lowering interest rates at this time:  Nadda, ziltch, rien, nothing?  The problem is that Wolf has to tip his hat to conventional wisdom.  If not; he has no hope of bending the ears of policy makers.  Oh well, that is his plight not mine.

Here, given none are listening we may speak frankly.  The world economy is in the toilet because free trade, tax cuts, deregulation and above all the liberalization of finance over the last thirty years let loose a Tsunami of forces both economic and political.  The liberalization of finance and production allowed for the national gutting and then global whipsawing of labour.  As the profiteers profited and retired workers slept while the assets they had built were being systematically stripped and the fortunes being amassed were then turned to the seedy business (although a time honoured practice if one cares to actually read Smith) of buying off the government–and it must be stressed the intelligentsia too–broadly understood.

We now have the perfect storm.  A generation of public and private sector functionaries has been trained to believe that the market can do no wrong and the government no good.  As a corollary is of course the proposition that monetary and regressive tax policy is everything.

The irony, of course, is that any credible account of the present crisis would have to admit that we are here because free trade, tax cuts, deregulation, the flexibilization of labour markets  and above all the liberalization of finance brought us here.  How odd it is then that we should be treated to more of  the same as the cure for what ails us.

The Right Wing Commentariat is getting Desperate

Just go read Terence Corcoran’s latest in the National Post.  Never mind that the world was plunged into economic crisis by unregulated financial institutions and near fully captured regulators; never mind that by most accounts the financial regulatory reform that has taken place since has been mild and the regulators are still, for the most part, in the hostage room.  Terence tell us that one of the central reasons for the continuation of the slump is:

Banks are being regulated to an extent never seen before, forcing the world’s core providers of credit for business expansion to curb their appetite for risk. Confusion reigns as global and trans-national regulators blunder their way to impose ill-conceived rules and policies. The hard reality of new rules, ­especially new capital requirements, is that it forces banks to accumulate risk-free liabilities while curbing risk-taking loans.

For the right it is always the same villain: the government.  During the crisis they blamed the government because…wait for it…they did not regulate properly and the crisis was therefore evidence of state not market failure.  Now, as then, it is the state that is failing, not markets.

To wit, Terence finishes with:

Similar government interventions, bolstered by constant calls for more spending and taxes, are the norm through most of the G20 membership. To end the many debt crises, the first step should be to abandon growth-killing policies. With growth, even debts cease to be a problem.

Just where is Terence getting his information from?  The G20 is busy doing austerity across the advanced capitalist zone and not in the form of tax increases.  Does he even read his colleagues blogs?

A rotting fruit that does not give vent to its own demand?

Given we seem to be stuck in fairly heady economic times it seems worthwhile to me to put out another post on the subject of employment, labour force growth and unemployment. In this post I am going to revisit the question of labour supply and demand and then take a closer look at the related issues of structural unemployment and the rotting skills (hysteresis) and dependency thesis  that has gained so much popularity in policy circles since mid 90s.

In a former post I mentioned the surge in labour supply during the 70s and 80s yet the graph I produced was a little underwhelming because it took a look at the underlying demographic growth of potential labour supply and not actual labour supply.  So this time I have have subtracted total labour force growth from total employment growth. Again, a positive reading indicates demand growth is outstripping supply growth and thus a decrease in the unemployment rate.  The inverse is that a negative reading says labour supply growth is greater than labour demand growth and thus leads to an increase in the unemployment rate. Here is the graph:

This is fairly sobering stuff.  The jobs boom of the 60s gave way to the deluge in the labour supply of 70s from which the employment market not to mention the welfare state has never fully recovered.  All that talk in the 90s about the need to reform UI/EI was not really about workers gaming the system it was about a welfare state that could not and would not provide the kind of insurance necessary to cover an over 70 % participation rate in which workers were more likely to be unemployed.  The graph below shows just how ugly it can get.

Clearly the deluge in the labour supply 70s had profound impact on long term unemployment which amounted not to an institutionally determined behavioural switch in workers propensity to work but rather a structural shift in the labour supply curve sans an equally profound shift in the demand curve for labour.  We know for example that for two decades, from the late 70s to late 90s, that real wages were stagnant indicating a loss in the bargaining power of Canadian workers. Yet despite the loss in wage bargaining traction, demand for labour was not forthcoming until the dot com and later housing booms of the late 90s and 2000s.  At the end of the day it was the bubble economies which finally, and fictitiously managed to work through the supply boom of the 70s.

If there is any doubt that demand for labour is the most important determinant of structural unemployment rates we need only look south to our American cousins.  In the graph below I have plotted US long term unemployment rates along side the Canadian rates.

Despite or because of higher US productivity during the 2000s the US had already begun to move towards higher levels of structural unemployment than Canada during the early 2000s something not seen since the mid 70s.  Clearly the severity of the last recession in US accounts for most of the difference in long term unemployment rates.  I have not seen any research which argues that the US has a significantly more generous unemployment insurance system than Canada.

The popular myth promulgated throughout 90s was that structural rates were high because they were high.  In the literature this is called hysteresis.  The basic idea is that the longer  a worker is unemployed the less employable they become because their skills degrade like a piece of fresh fruit on the kitchen table.  The hysteresis argument was used in turn to argue for more restricted access to EI and lower benefits to encourage workers to get back to work before their skills rotted.  This all had the air populist plausibility particularly when combined with the trend toward increasingly individualistic explanations for collective social problems in the social sciences especially economics.  But whatever the strange brew of populist folk wisdom–that workers prefer the dole to working–and academic fads the problem is, as the graph above demonstrates, high structural unemployment and hysteresis seem to magically disappear when there is strong demand for labour.  And that demand, as the graph above also suggests, is determined by the general health of the macro economy and has nothing particularly to do with the supply characteristics of labour.

To put a fine point on the argument what needs to be demanded of the purveyors of the hysteresis hypothesis is just what reversed the rotting of workers’ skills that magically made them employable after 1991-92.  Was there a steady increase in the funding of retraining programs for example?  And what about the US what was going on after 2001 did the Skills of US labour all of sudden just start rotting?

The alternative narrative to the rotting skills / lazy labour thesis is that the 70s was a period of structural realignment in which secular period of decreased GDP per capita growth set in matched by a deluge of labour supply.  The 80s and 90s were thus periods of adjustment to this new reality.  The UK the US and Canada were early supply side reformers which consciously sought to re-enforce the punitive logic of capitalist labour markets in order to assure price stability (tame inflation) and break workers bargaining power.  In other words, neoliberal macro-policy, despite protestations to the contrary, had nothing much to with solving the problem of long term and high structural rates of unemployment.  It was a feature not a glitch that the solution to that problem would have to wait until the supply side reforms delivered up their magic via a tsunami of consumer credit and control fraud serving up a ponzi economy that could approach something close to what could be called full employment.

As this report from the BLS (p.23 A-12) demonstrates long term structural unemployment has gotten worse in the US not better since 2009.  Most sober economists will concede that this has everything to do with the health of the US economy.  But it will not be long before the rotting skills thesis is floated into the stream of policy discourse as a cover for the fact that like with the financial sector the solution is to kick the problem down the road and blame the victims along the way.

*Note that Stats Can defines long term unemployment as 1 year + whereas the BLS defines it as 27 months weeks +.  By using 6 months + which conforms to the format of the data reported by the OECD I have more less deployed the BLS definition.

Towards an adult conversation about Canadian labour markets

Have you ever heard the urban legend about how such and such generation of Canadians are lazier than the past generation?  Or the One about how this generation just does not want to work and why we need to make sure EI under-insures job loss to guard against loafers taking advantage of the system?  I have.  In fact I heard that story for all of my adolescent and adult life despite the fact that I took any job that was on offer since the age of 13.  I thought myself to be a rather industrious exception to the layabout tendencies of my generation.  But like most self perceptions and ruling policy narratives it turns out it is, scientifically speaking, unadulterated bullshit.  By which I mean that that the facts neither fit my self stylized superiority  complex nor the policy meme about the need to restructure labour market institutions to deal with the pragmatics of a generation beset by a pampered recalcitrance towards work.  Again, scientifically speaking, by which I mean the facts do not fit the narrative, it is total bullshit.
Here is what the data says .  In the graph below I have plotted two metrics of the propensity to work.  The first is simply the total amount of employment divided by the total population aged 15-64.  The second is total employment divided by total population.  Notice the two series more or less track each other.  Also notice they both trend upwards.  Significance? Let us take the first metric, in 1960 around 58 percent of all Canadians between 15 and 64 were employed in paid labour markets by 2008 around 74 percent were employed.  What does that mean? It means that generationally speaking more of us work than ever before in the history of Canada in paid labour markets.  And this holds true for the second metric (line below the first plot).

Having been disabused of the usual suspects what then accounts for the increasing levels of employment insecurity since the sixties.  In short the answer is the supply of labour and the demand for labour.  Simply put supply has been increasingly outstripping demand.  Don’t believe me then look at the data.  In the graph below I have simply subtracted the growth in employment from the growth in the population between 15 and 64 years of age.  A negative reading means population growth is higher than employment growth.  Take a look at the trend line.

Canadians are supplying far more labour for hire than they ever have.  What has changed is that the economy is simply not absorbing the labour supply available.  So two questions arise.  Why are Canadians supplying so much paid labour and why can’t aggregate demand match aggregate supply?  Answers to those question will have to wait for another post but those are the serious questions.

Note: All data are from the OECD.  Click on graphs for enlarged and clear images

Never count on economists to defend the public interest

This is something that should always be kept in mind in economic policy discussions: most economists are pro-Market, not pro-Public Interest.

It is especially important to keep this in mind when we read commentary such as this, in which an economist from one of Canada’s smaller economics departments conflates being pro-market with being in the public interest.

This point is sometimes hard to see, especially since many economists hold to the deeply ingrained syllogism that being pro-market is straightforwardly being in the public interest.

But they are a lobby group like any other, and cannot be relied upon to defend the general public interest.*

Economists, particularly academic economists (and like all academics), rely on, for their social status, research funding and a quiet concious, having the public view them as working in the public interest. And given the majority of economists are true believers in the “market” that inevitably gets conflated with being in the public interest

Cloaking oneself as being in the public interest is of course one of the oldest rhetorical stances to take since like wearing the national flag it clearly puts the speaker in the role of the hero and casts those being spoken against in the role of the villains. This is all the more easy to to do when the terms of conversation are being articulated in fuzzy, ill defined concepts such as the “public interest” and “pro-market”. When an economist uses those terms they have very exotic definitions in mind that most lay people would not readily grasp. Perhaps I am being too charitable: I can’t, in fact, find a definition of the public interest in any my economics text-books.

The public interest is a rather fuzzy notion. We can perhaps all agree that it has something to do with public goods but that just raises the thorny issue of what is and what is not a public good. In any case the argument at least has to be made that a specific policy is in the public good and why. Just standing around hands waiving in the air mindlessly chanting pro-market rhetoric like “free trade” or deregulation does not really cut the mustard.

Indeed after a generation of pro-market policies like financial liberalization and deregulation with cascading financial crises of increasingly damaging intensity culminating in the Great Financial Crisis that was 2007 and from which no advanced capitalist economy has yet to emerge; in which whole nations like Iceland, Greece and Ireland were raised; in which untold millions of workers were put and remain out of work; and as a consequence a massive hole was blown in public finances around the world, it should be clear that pro-market policies are not always or even in the majority of cases un-problematically in the public good to say the very least.

Notice that even if you are want to argue that it was bad government regulation in the US which caused the Great Financial Crisis the fact is that decades of financial liberalization and deregulation (pro-market policies) directly led to the formation of global investment and insurance markets which made sure that a “made in the USA” problem had serious global consequences. And it is not just that economists did not foresee these negative consequences they actually argued in favour of these policies on the grounds that such a crisis was less likely to occur and that the consequences would be less severe in the event that it did occur because these pro-market policies allowed risk to be more evenly spread. So much for theory.

That a pro-market economist is given a national soap-box on which to conflate being Pro-market with being in the Public Interest does not bode well for the Public Interest.

* The first four paragraphs are an inverted paraphrase of the linked commentary. I apologize to my readers for reproducing a very clichéd prose style.

Effecient Market Hypothesis: 40 Years of Confusion

I just finished reading a commentary by Bernard Guerrien and Ozgur Gun entitled Efficient Market Hypothesis: What are we talking about? . Inter alia the authors do an efficient job (as in 12 pages) not at demolishing the efficient markets hypothesis but rather the central confusion created by Fama’s inclusion of the term of efficiency into what had prior to the 70s been a discussion not about whether or not financial markets could be fairly described as efficient but rather about whether they could be fairly described as a “fair game.”

The distinction is incredibly important because something can be fair but not efficient and vice-a-versa. If we define “efficiency” to mean the quickest possible method to arrive at a decision between two strategies to achieve the same goal then the strategy chosen and the attainment of the goal has nothing to do with the efficiency or fairness of the process used to arrive at the decision. A coin toss would be both a fair and efficient process. A mother saying to her child “we will do X” is equally efficient but not fair.

Economics of course has a peculiar and convoluted definition of efficiency which is directly related to the the confusion introduced by Fama by maintaining that financial markets were not only a fair game but an efficient process. As the authors show, Fama conflated the fairness of the market (price formation displaying a random walk, i.e., unpredictable), with the proposition that a spot market price reflects the “true” valuation of say a publicly traded equity on an exchange on any given day, minute or second.

It is easy to imagine that an equity’s price reflects its “real” value and imagine that that price was arrived at through a contrived and unfair process (insider information). Fama conflated all these issues and that is why when queried in 2010 he responded that EMH was right because everyone got burned; that is, it is a fair game because nobody can beat the market. But as Bernard Guerrien and Ozgur Gun remark:

Now, it is not harmless to replace “beat the market” by “market efficiency”. For economists “efficiency” has a precise meaning: Pareto optimality. That is, a propriety of resources’ allocation which has little to do with stock markets and speculation. On the contrary, there is a close relation between Pareto optimality and general competitive equilibrium (through the two Welfare Theorems); it seems then natural to put forward this particular “model of equilibrium” – as it is suggested by Fama himself at the beginning of his 1970’s paper. With, as a result, even more confusion.

I will leave readers to go and read the paper to fill in the gaps. What however I found really interesting is the account the authors gave as to why such a central confusion could become the dominant account of financial markets. The conclusion they come to is:

Only ideology – strong a priori beliefs – and circumstances can explain Fama’s decision to term the “old” Bachelier-Samuelson no-free-lunch theory “efficient market hypothesis”. In 1970, Fama was professor at the University of Chicago, where the “new classical macroeconomy” was elaborated on the postulate that an economy is always – thanks to “rational expectations” – in competitive equilibrium. Efficient resource allocations (that is, Pareto optimality) results from this postulate – at least if “market failures” are excluded. Contrary to the old “monetarist” (Friedman) tradition, external shocks – even those provoked by government’ discretionary actions – are not supposed to generate inefficiencies. Agents can be (temporary) fooled, but they always realize their optimal plan. Markets became a sort of deus ex machina which instantaneously (re)allocates resources in an efficient way12. In a nutshell, they are “efficient”. That is a postulate, an a priori belief, not a (testable) result.

This is a very interesting and concise commentary and is worth readers’ time. So go read the paper.